Written by (Mohamed Al-Baba)
Russian oil is still reaching its destinations more than two years after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite the extensive Western sanctions on Moscow, the most important of which are the economic sanctions targeting the oil sector in particular, using used oil tankers purchased by Russian shipping companies to deliver Russian oil to countries that do not impose a ban on this oil, such as China or India.
According to a report by the US Treasury Department issued in 2020, the “shadow fleet” tankers follow the method of circumvention and camouflage by changing the flags they carry, turning off the transmitters so that they cannot be tracked, or even sending deceptive signals, in addition to exchanging oil at sea. These tankers change the name of the ship, and they also use the names of fictitious companies, or forge documents to hide the ownership of the tanker, which usually sails without any real insurance on it, as they aim through all these arrangements to stay out of the reach of maritime law enforcement agencies.
By late 2023, Russia’s “shadow fleet” numbered about 1,800 vessels, accounting for a fifth of global oil trade, according to maritime intelligence firm Windward. The United States and its allies are considering additional sanctions and could move further to increase the cost of Russia’s use of a “shadow fleet” of tankers to evade a G7 price cap on Russian oil.
The United States has created a coalition of countries to enforce a price cap that pledges not to buy Russian crude above $60 per barrel, and those countries have banned their shipping companies and insurers (the major players in global shipping) from facilitating trade in Russian crude above that cap.
Russia’s methods of circumventing Western sanctions have boosted the business of dozens of hard-to-track traders and shippers, who earn more than $11 billion a year in Moscow’s oil revenues as shadow carriers.
Although the fleet’s primary purpose is to support Russian oil exports, its ships have increasingly come under suspicion for sabotaging undersea infrastructure. For several months, the risks of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” have been growing, a group of older tankers secretly transporting Russian crude oil around the world.
The use of a shadow fleet for sabotage operations offers Russia several advantages, most notably the ability to evade responsibility, as opaque structures related to ownership, management, and ship registration make it difficult to trace control of the vessel back to Russia. For example, the oil tanker Eagle S is managed by a company based in the United Arab Emirates, operated by an Indian company, and registered under the Cook Islands flag.
This complexity allows Russia to claim ignorance, as demonstrated by its assertion that Finland’s seizure of the Eagle S was not its fault. Finnish authorities detained the Eagle S, a Cook Islands-flagged tanker whose anchor is believed to have damaged the cable.
According to the European Union, the ship may be part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” — a group of tankers and other cargo ships that Russia uses informally to evade sanctions on oil transportation.
However, the entry of this fleet into the line of additional missions such as sabotaging energy cables has raised concerns among Europeans, as the European Union had previously warned of this fleet, and pledged to take stronger measures following suspected sabotage of an underwater energy cable off the coast of Finland.
Kaya Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, said in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt: “The bloc will take stronger measures to address the risks posed by these ships.”
She also stressed that this fleet threatens the environment and finances the Russian war budget, noting that these ships are suspected of involvement in sabotage.
In addition, the former Prime Minister of Estonia pointed out that sabotage operations in Europe have increased since Russia began its war against Ukraine in February 2022. She added: “The recent sabotage attempts in the Baltic Sea are not isolated incidents, but rather constitute a deliberate pattern aimed at harming our digital and energy infrastructure.”
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has also raised concerns about this “shadow fleet” and called for more European sanctions. “This decrepit fleet poses a serious threat to the European environment and security,” she said. “Vessels are currently damaging important submarine cables in the Baltic Sea almost every month.”
These statements came after the Estlink 2 submarine energy cable between Estonia and Finland was damaged, in what Finnish officials suspect may have been an act of sabotage.
Following the incident, Finnish authorities detained the Cook Islands-flagged oil tanker Eagle S, whose anchor is believed to have damaged the cable.
According to the European Union, the ship may be part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” – a group of tankers and other cargo ships that Russia uses informally to evade sanctions on oil transportation.
The size of the shadow fleet represents an effective extension of Russia’s naval and intelligence capabilities. Although these ships lack traditional combat functions, they are well suited to gray zone tactics and hybrid threats. Operating under the guise of commercial activities and protected by international maritime law, shadow fleet ships can navigate International waters largely unnoticed. Unlike Russian naval or research vessels, which are closely monitored, commercial ships are more difficult to track.
Recruiting shadow fleet vessels for sabotage purposes is relatively straightforward, as they are already under some form of Russian government control. It takes little effort to convince a ship’s crew to pull anchor and damage undersea infrastructure. Moreover, these actions have psychological repercussions. Despite While only a handful of ships are currently suspected of sabotage, suspicion extends to the entire fleet. This implied threat of Russia’s ability to carry out large-scale sabotage operations enhances the fleet’s strategic influence.
Beyond outright sabotage, shadow fleet vessels are also engaged in other activities. For example, the Eagle S tanker may have been carrying signals intelligence systems, according to a report by Lloyd’s List. The ship has previously deployed “sensor-type devices” in the English Channel, further highlighting the fleet’s hybrid capabilities.
Sanctioning ships is part of the solution to the shadow fleet threat, but it remains limited in its effectiveness. Sanctions require precise identification of shadow fleet vessels. The complexity of the fleet makes it difficult to map it comprehensively: the UK recently sanctioned only 20 ships, a small fraction of a fleet of more than 1,000. The Eagle S, which was involved in the Finland-Estonia incident, was not on the EU’s list of 79 sanctioned ships.
Enhanced maritime protection is another part of the response, but it requires significant resources and cannot guarantee complete security. Monitoring suspicious vessels is vital to eliminating the possibility of Russian evasion. But proactive protection of all undersea infrastructure is impractical; coast guard and naval resources are already stretched, and diverting them from other essential tasks may play into the hands of adversaries like Russia.
The most successful approach is to target the vessel and its crew. Damaging undersea infrastructure requires active decisions by the crew. Investigations can determine whether there was negligence or deliberate intent. Proactively detaining suspect vessels and crew, along with clear deterrence measures, can help reduce the chances of sabotage.
Recent incidents show the effectiveness of this strategy: Finnish special forces boarded the Eagle S, directed it into Finnish waters, and detained its crew. A few days later, Finland denied the vessel permission to operate after technical inspections revealed significant safety issues.
A strong approach to seizing and detaining vessels may deter further sabotage, but it carries risks. Shadow fleet operations exist in legal grey areas, making arrests and seizures legally complex. Western states must respect maritime law to maintain their international credibility. Questionable actions could undermine this principle. Reactions from hostile states, including the seizure of legitimate vessels on false pretenses, could disrupt international trade, which is vital to Western economies. Addressing the shadow fleet threat requires a multi-pronged strategy that balances sanctions, maritime protection, and direct deterrence while upholding international law. Without such measures, the threat to Europe’s critical undersea infrastructure will continue to grow.
